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1. Introduction
The Association For the Republic - Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ)
was a small radical right populist party in the Czech Republic led by Miroslav Sládek,
which was politically successful for much of the 1990s. It was represented in the
Czech parliament between 1992 and 1998, but its support subsequently declined and
the party lost parliamentary representation and the rapidly fragmented. Radical right
forces in the Czech Republic have since failed to unite and, despite high profile and
provocative bursts of activism and have remained electorally and political marginal.
In this chapter, I examine the SPR-RSČ as a case study of party-based oppositional
outsider populism in a consolidating democracy. Having first traced the origins and
development of the party I then examine the populist nature of the radical right
appeals it made in the Czech lands in 1990s and the implicit understanding of
democracy these contained. I concluded by evaluating the Republicans’ impact on the
development Czech democracy and assessing the extent to which it has left a legacy
in contemporary Czech politics.
2. The rise and fall of the SPR-RSČ
The SPR-RSČ was formed in December 1989 as a ‘radical right-wing party’ by
Miroslav Sládek and a group of associates, formally registering as a party in February
1990. The party seems to have originated as one of a plethora small, anti-communist
groups founded in late 1989 during the course of Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution
which styled themselves ‘right-wing’ and ‘Republican’ - an allusion to both US2
Republicans and the conservative interwar Czechoslovak Agrarians, who officially
styled themselves the Republican Party. Neither Sládek, who worked as a low-ranking
official for the Czech censor’s office, nor were other founders of the SPR-RSČ
politically active before 1989. None seem to have been Communist Party members or
to have had contacts with either dissidents or the less visible ‘grey zone’ of
oppositionally minded technocrats that emerged in 1980s. The SPR-RSČ was quickly
marked out by Sládek’s egocentric, dominant personality and radical outspoken
statements, which led to a rapid breakdown in attempts to co-operate with similar
small groupings. Sládek’s group thus contested the 1990 Czech and Czechoslovak
elections outside the main alliance of small new anti-communist groupings, the
Conservative Party - Free Bloc – (KS - SB).
1
The SPR-RSČ, initially profiled itself as a respectable right-wing nationalist anti-
communist party critical of Czechoslovakia’s new president, the dissident playwright,
Václav Havel and his Civic Forum movement for not becoming ‘a platform for
electoral struggle against the communists’.
2 However, chauvinistic and authoritarian
elements – such as support for a strong presidency and hostility to African and
Vietnamese guest workers - are detectable in the party’s earliest programmatic
documents and, even more so, in Sládek’s statements and speeches. In the June 1990
Czech and Czechoslovak parliamentary elections both the Free Bloc and the SPR-
RSČ’s joint electoral list with the tiny All People’s Democratic Party (VLDS)
1 Although the SPR-RSČ fielded candidates in both the Czech lands and Slovakia before the break-up
of the Czechoslovak federation in 1993, it was in essence a purely Czech-based organization and its
support in Slovakia was always negligible.
2 ‘Hlavní referát přednesený předsedou strany PhDr Miroslavem Sládkem’ in Sdružení pro republiku -
REPUBLIKANSKÁ STRANA Československa - Materialy z ustavujícího sjezdu, undated booklet, Civic
Forum Archive, Institute for Contemporary History, Prague Box 4 (Politická komise - interní
informační materiály), sl. 5, p. 1.3
received negligible support, each gaining just over one per cent in the Czech lands
and winning no deputies in either the Czech or Czechoslovak federal parliaments.
In the course of 1990 Sládek’s party developed a distinct brand of right-wing politics
combining disruptive activism with ultra-radical conspiracy-minded anti-communism
and a pallet of anti-elite, chauvinistic and racist anti-Roma themes. Using its newly
founded weekly Republika started to promote conspiracy theories that the Velvet
Revolution had staged as a result of secret agreements between Communist and
dissident elites. The SPR-RSČ also received considerable publicity from protest
demonstrations it organized against this ‘conspiracy’ during President George H. W.
Bush’s visit to Prague in November 1990. Banners in English held by party activists,
visible in media coverage of the event, read ‘President Bush - You Are Talking To
Communists’. Independent reports spoke of estimated 2000 - 3000 Sládek supporters
attending protest demonstrations organized to coincide with the visit.
3 In addition to
anti-communism, the SPR-RSČ took up eclectic mix of issues designed to draw rapid
support popular. It called for larger social benefits and increased public services;
greater law and order; less bureaucracy and state intervention; the re-incorporation of
Transcarpathia (ceded to the USSR in 1945) into Czechoslovakia;
4 the defence of
Czech national interests against the West (and, in particular, supposed German and
Sudeten German revanchism); and calls for tough measures against the Roma
minority as a (supposed) source of crime and disorder, the racism for which the party
became best known.
5 From spring 1991, the party’s extreme and outrageous rhetoric,
3 See ‘Národní třída po roce’, Republika, no. 10, 26 November 1990 and ‘Zazněl nám zvon svodody?’,
Svobodné slovo, 19 November 1990, pp. 1 and 4.
4 The region is also known as Sub-Carpathian Ukraine and Ruthenia.
5 Some analysts suggest that the Republicans toned down anti-Roma and anti-foreign rhetoric before
the 1992 elections to focus on criticising government corruption and the failure to fight crime. See J.
Pehe, ‘The Emergence of Right-wing extremism’, Report on Eastern Europe, 28 June 1991, pp.1-6.4
provocative and well publicized demonstrations, and continual public campaigning in
rallies and open air meetings addressed by Sládek had mobilized enough support to
create a small national organization and growing electoral support.
6 In June 1992
benefiting from the fluid and uncertain political environment created by the break-up
of Civic Forum into separate parties, the launching of economic reforms and the
Czech-Slovak tensions over the redesign of the Czechoslovak federation, as illustrated
in tables 1 and 2 the SPR-RSČ made an electoral breakthrough, polling just over 6
per cent of the Czech vote in parliamentary elections and gaining representation in
both the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly and the Czech parliament.
[TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
The Republicans’ parliamentary faction quickly fragmented – nine of the SPR-RSČ’s
14 federal deputies elected in 1992 rapidly broke with the party. However, this
represented only a limited setback for the party, as the SPR-RSČ was largely inactive
in the legislative process, preferring instead to continue its strategy of outrageous
headline grabbing protest stunts.
7 Republican representative thus repeatedly came into
conflict with the police and the courts, usually in connection with laws on inciting
racial hatred and public order offences: Sládek, for example, was prosecuted for
remarks in 1997 that the only thing Czechs should regret about their relationship with
the Germans is that they did kill more of them during the Second World War.
8 The
6 The party also received supportive publicity from newly established sensationalist tabloids such as
Špígl and Expres.
7 Such events included the blocking of the main Prague-Bratislava highway by SPR-RSČ members in
1993; regular SPR-RSČ rallies in Prague Wenceslas Square on 28 October, the anniversary of
Czechoslovak independence; the disruption of a commemoration in 1994 at the site of the Terezín
(Theresienstadt) concentration camp, where German representatives were present; and the nationwide
distribution in 1995 of leaflets alleging a conspiracy between the Czech and German governments to
return the Sudetenland to Germany. Sládek was also nominated by his party as a presidential candidate
in 1992, 1993 and 1998, using the special parliamentary sessions that elected the Czechoslovak (and
later Czech) President as a platform to make inflammatorily phrased attacks on establishment
politicians.
8 M. Mareš, Pravicový extremismus a radikalismus v ČR, Brno: Barrister & Principal, pp. 196-7.5
greater access to the media it enjoyed as a parliamentary party and the platform
afforded by parliament itself also enable the SPR-RSČ to amplify its message and
build on its initial success. In the 1996 Czech parliamentary elections, the party
gained over 8 per cent of the vote, its representation in the Czech parliament from 14
to 18 deputies.
However, in early parliamentary elections in June 1998, despite having performed
strongly two years earlier and mounted a costly and apparently effective billboard
campaign, the Republicans saw a dramatic decline in their vote unexpectedly failed to
re-enter the Czech parliament. Exit polling suggested that, unlike in previous years,
the party had failed to win over significant numbers of first time voters and that many
younger, less educated male voters, who had previously supported the Republicans
turned in 1998 to the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD), who offered a more credible
and professional solution to the economic issues of pressing concern to such groups.
9
The party was also undermined by revelations about Sládek‘s management of the
party, the most damaging of which concerned his nepotistic placement of his partner
(later his second wife) and relatives on the party’s electoral list in 1996 and apparent
misuse of party funds to finance his own lifestyle.
10 The latter accusation seems to
have been especially damaging electorally given the party’s regular attacks on
established politicians as personally corrupt and self-seeking.
Faced with this sharp electoral reverse the SPR-RSČ was rapidly undermined by
organizational instabilities stemming from its culture of activism; charismatic
leadership; and lack of functional formal party structures. The SPR-RSČ was
essentially a loose network of local groups linked to a national leadership dominated
9 M. Kreidl and K. Vlachová ‘Rise and Decline of Right-Wing Extremism in the Czech Republic in the
1990s’, Czech Sociological Review, 8 (1), 2000, pp. 69-91.
10 D. Tácha ‘Živili jsme Sládka’, Týden, 37/98, pp. 37-96
by who ran it through a clique of trusted associates, friends and relatives.
11 Sládek’s
personal dominance of the party had already led to repeated factional conflicts and
several waves of defections,
12 all of which accelerated after its debacle in the 1998
parliamentary elections and subsequent further electoral decline in regional authorities
in 2000. After the party was declared bankrupt in 2001 because it was unable to pay
employees, remaining members regrouped in a new, smaller successor organization:
the Miroslav Sládek Republicans (RMS). However, the RMS’s electoral impact was
negligible and the organization declined into a political rump, which was a relatively
minor player even on the Czech Republic’s small radical right scene. In the
succeeding years other radical right party have made a similarly significant electoral
impact in the Czech Republic.
2. The SPR-RSČ as a populist radical right party
Although Central and East European parties sit uncomfortably within some
comparative typologies derived from the West European experience, the Republicans
fit comfortably with the category of radical right populist party, understood as a
combination of populism and with ideological characteristics of nativism, social
authoritarianism and scepticism towards liberal democracy.
13 The SPR-RSČ’s
nativism was expressed in an ethnically exclusive xenophobic vision of the
11 Sládek reportedly personally decided the nomination (or removal) of conference delegates,
candidates and members of the party executive, all aspects of party policy, organization and finance. A.
Cerqueirová, Republikáni: Šokující odhalení, Place of publication not stated: Unholy Cathedral, 1999,
pp. 59-78.
12 After the initial departure of moderates alienated by Sládek’s radicalism in early 1990, the Radical
Republican Party (RRS) broke away after the 1990 elections and joined with other ex-SPR-RSČ
members (including two Republican deputies) who had left Sládek’s party in 1992 and 1995 to form
the Party of Republican and National Democratic Unity (SRNDJ), later re-named the Patriotic
Republican Party (VRS). VRS was joined by a further large group from SPR-RSČ in 1998. See M.
Mareš, Pravicový extremismus a radikalismus v ČR, op.cit. pp. 190-99, 225-238.
13 C. Mudde, Populist Radical Right parties in Europe. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007.7
Czechoslovak (and later Czech) state defined by anti-Roma racism, anti-German
nationalism and rejection of membership in international organizations, including
both NATO and the EU. Its authoritarianism was expressed in demands for law and
order, tougher punishments for criminals including the restoration of the death
penalty. In almost all cases, issues of crime and disorder were either ethnicized and
explained as part of the ‘Gypsy problem’, or put into a populist idiom and discussed
in terms of the criminality and corruption of elites. However, unlike Czech neo-fascist
and neo-Nazi groupuscules after 1989, the SPR-RSČ was not opposed on principle to
representative democracy, which (like a number of mainstream parties) it wished to
supplment with elements of direct citizen participation.
By the mid-1990s the Republicans had come to see themselves as part of a Europe
wide family of ‘radical right’ parties which, they believed, were a response to the
wider ‘moral crisis of the democratic system’ plagued by corruption, criminality,
immigration, the ‘dictatorship of money’ and the inability of governing coalitions to
resolve the problems of ordinary people.
14 The party enjoyed close relations with
France’s Front National (FN) and participated in several events organized as part of
the first incarnation of the EURONAT grouping sponsored by the FN. The SPR-RSČ
ideology combined this radical right outlook with a populist discourse containing all
three key core characteristics outlined by Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde in the
introduction to this volume: 1) a view of society as divided into two homogenous and
hostile groups - a corrupt self-serving elite and a morally unsullied People; 2) an
understanding of such divisions as predominantly moral, that is based on character
and self-chosen conduct; and 3) a conception of the proper purpose of politics as the
expression of social and national unity, and its defence against threatening external
14 M. Sládek, To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda, Brno: SPR-RSČ, pp. 73-48
forces or corrupt internal minorities. The Republicans’ specific construction of these
elements was essentially framed in terms of a radical anti-communist ideology of
regime change.
2.1 ‘Ordinary people’ versus corrupt (crypto)-communist elites
The Republicans saw themselves as representing hardworking, previously
unpoliticized ‘ordinary people’ who had been neglected and overlooked by privileged
elite groups, from the communist nomenklatura and the dissident intelligentsia alike.
Early in 1990 Miroslav Sládek summed up this view speaking of his party defending
‘...ordinary people, who are the salt of the earth, they work, they look after
families, they were here through the most difficult of times and had to rely
only on their miserable wages. They didn’t emigrate; neither did anyone
support them in a professional career. It is they who make up this country.
They should therefore have the opportunity to influence this country’s
future (...) And not merely to watch passively as power is taken over ..’.
15
As this described elite-mass relations both during communism and in the transition
from communism, the Republicans thus unsurprisingly viewed Czechoslovakia post-
1989 political institutions as essentially a continuation of the old regime: a ‘new
totalitarianism’, outwardly reformed, but also basically continuous with former
communist nomenklatura in their use of a media monopoly to maintain an ideological
façade of pluralism as means of exercising social control for self-seeking reasons.
16
As Sládek explained, the new political parties had
15 ‘Hlavní referát přednesený předsedou strany PhDr Miroslavem Sládkem’, op.cit., p.1.
16 ‘Hlavní referát přednesený předsedou strany PhDr Miroslavem Sládkem’, op.cit., pp, 1-2.9
‘very small to tiny memberships, but their leaderships have an excess of
financial resources and unlimited access to the media ... now fully in the
hands of this new totalitarianism. (.....). These parties identify with
different political currents, not for programmatic reasons, but for reasons
of personal advancement (z prospěchářských důvodů), because they think
that this or that current will enable them to continue their sweet inactivity
at the expense of the majority of citizens’.
17.
The party partly explained such elite collusion through conspiracy theories, actively
promoting the work of Miroslav Dolejší, a political prisoner in 1950s later re-
imprisoned on politically motivated charges in 1970s and 80s, who claimed that
dissidents had been a secret reserve of loyal Communist Party members created in
1969-70 whom the regime had only pretended to persecute and that, consequently, the
1989 Velvet Revolution had been the product of a secret agreement between Reagan
and Gorbachev in 1987 and staged jointly by the KGB and the CIA. However, the
party also used the more widely accepted argument – influential on both the radical
anti-communist right and among mainstream right-wing elements in Civic Forum –
that the reform communist politics of many dissidents in 1960s gave them an
unacceptable ideological and political affinity with current communist nomenklatura
elites. Such arguments, although they could be formulated subtly, quickly became
reduced to a straightforward equation of dissidents and communists and were
generally used by the Republicans in this form.
18
Not only the Velvet Revolution, but all subsequent developments were explained
within this framework of elite manipulation as staged and manipulated by a powerful,
17 M. Sládek, ....tak to vidím já., Brno: SPR-RSČ, 1992, p. 89.
18 See S. Hanley, The New Right in the New Europe: Czech transformation and right-wing politics,
1989-2006, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 164-6.10
sinister establishment, operating behind a facade of democracy. The creation of a
party system; the division of Czechoslovakia; coupon privatization; increasing social
inequality thus were all viewed as products of the conspiracies against the people by
an alliance of communist elites and crypto-communist dissidents. As an unsigned
article in Republika in 1992 discussing the imminent division of Czechoslovakia put it
‘I have the impression that everything was planned beforehand (similarly to the
Velvet Revolution) and that the Czech and Slovak nations have been deceived, abused
and violated by a foreign power working with its domestic lackeys (přisluhovačů)’.
19
The Republicans’ most original contribution to this radical anti-communist discourse
of elite collusion and manipulation was, as in the above citation, to link domestic
elites with external threats from foreign interests. For the Republicans such threats
stemmed mainly from the danger of economic and geo-political domination by
Germany and, to a lesser extent, Austria and, in particular, from Sudeten German
claims for recompense for the mass ‘transfer’ of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia
in 1945-6.
2.2 Moral politics
However, the SPR-RSČ construction of collusive communist and crypto-communist
elites was not framed purely in terms their (supposed) shared origins or ideological
affinities. Drawing on the common understanding– implicit in much dissident
discourse - of communism as primarily moral phenomenon (a form of evil) rather
than a social or historical one, the Republicans framed the distinction between people
and elite as a moral one between the decent and hardworking majority and a corrupt
and indolent minority, which was using its monopoly on political power dishonestly
19 ‘Vždy o nás rozhodl někdo jiný’, Republika, 16-22 November 1992, p. 7.11
to enrich itself in the privatization process, both directly and by serving foreign
interests.
20
The Republicans had highly personalized, moralistic view of politics which explained
the failings of political institutions in terms of establishment politicians’ personal
corruption and turpitude. By contrast, unlike both dissident and communist elites -
who, the Republicans argued, were interlinked and co-responsible for the inequities of
both past and present) -
21 the Republicans stressed that they were ‘new faces’ with a
‘clean record’. Unsurprisingly, the party’s discourses about the type of political
change it wished to bring about were replete with references to moral renewal,
purging and purification. The party’s internal culture of continual activist
mobilization, intended to build a distinct ethos of unity and self-sacrifice,
22 also
highlights the party’s ‘moralization’ of politics.
In contrast with the ‘decency’ and popular base of the SPR-RSČ, Civic Forum and its
various successor parties were depicted as vehicles for corruption, personal
enrichment and elite manipulation by ex-communist functionaries, dissidents and,
former black marketeers, which required ‘purging’
23 because although they had
money and power, but no roots among the people. In the Republican view
Czechoslovakia’s new liberal-democratic and liberal-market institutions were not
simply phoney and inauthentic, but the product of deliberate deceit by ruling elites,
further evidencing their moral turpitude. This was, in the Republican view, true not
20 This view often shaded into a more deeply anti-political view: politics was, as Sládek once put it, a
dark tunnel in which the only light by which people could orient themselves as they like fumbled their
way along was the Republican Party and its goals. Sládek, ....tak to vidím já, op.cit., p. 90.
21 See ‘Hlavní referát přednesený předsedou strany PhDr Miroslavem Sládkem’, op.cit., pp. 1-2.
22 Sládek, ....tak to vidím já, op.cit., p. 90.
23 See, for example, R. Havlík, ‘ODS = komunistická nebo fašistická strana’, Republika, no. 3, 20 - 26
January 1992, p. 3 or J. Bulba, ‘Proved’te očistu svých politických stran’, Republika, no. 37, 14 - 20
September 1992, p. 5.12
simply of pretended differences between communists and dissidents, or between
mainstream parties of left and right, but also of seemingly more impersonal economic
processes. Sládek thus argued that growing social inequalities resulting from
economic reform were a deliberate action intended by elites to depoliticize and
control discontent through poverty, rather than an indirect consequence of
marketization.
24
2. 3 Defending the national community
Although notionally in favour of liberal rights and political pluralism and certainly in
favour of private property, the Republicans viewed Czechoslovak (and later Czech)
society in terms of as organic community united by strong ethnic and historical bonds,
whose cohesion, distinctness, freedom and – over the longer term - very survival were
threatened by a range of external and internal threats, consciously and unconsciously
unleashed by elites.
25 These included such diverse phenomena as growing economic
inequality, family breakdown, declining birth-rates, rising crime, consumer culture
and European integration. The task of the Republican movement, Sládek explained,
was to counteract such centrifugal and disintegrative forces and to channel the
expression of the ‘will of the nation’ (vůle národa).
26 Consequently, the proper
relationship between state and society could be understood in collectivist and
paternalist terns: the role of the state was to care for the people and guarantee popular
well-being as means of preserving the nation. In Sládek’s view ensuring such security
24 M.Sládek, To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda, op.cit., p. 104.
25 The Republicans subscribed to a conservative form of Czechoslovakism which assumed that Czech
and Slovaks were brother nations, whose cultures and interests were closely aligned, but rejected the
notion of distinct progressive ‘Czechoslovak Idea’ associated with T. G. Masaryk, the first president of
Czechoslovakia.
26 Sládek, ....tak to vidím já, op.cit., pp. 27-9.13
for the people ‘... is not the right but the duty of the state, if it is to have any reason for
its existence’.
27
2. 4 The Republicans’ understanding of democracy
In the 1990s the Czech Republic saw an extensive public and political debate political
debate about the most appropriate model of democracy. In outline, it opposed those
who favoured a liberal, majoritarian model based on bi-polar competition between
professionalized, ideologically well defined parties of left and right, such as the then
Prime Minister (and current President) Václav Klaus, to those favouring a more
consensus-based model with greater scope for organized interests, direct citizen
participation and a civil society to play a role in decision making. This best known
representative of such a view was the Czechoslovak (1989-92) and later Czech (1993-
2003) President Václav Havel. However, it was a vision broadly shared across the
political centre and centre-left of Czech politics, albeit with a greater emphasis on
traditional corporatist arrangements by the Social Democrats and Christian
Democrats.
28
Situating the Republicans in such debates – and identifying the party’s broader
understanding of democracy – is, however, problematic. Firstly, the Republicans
showed limited interest in policy or programme development and, in contrast to
radical right parties in some other European states, the party was not support by a
distinct right-wing nationalist intelligentsia milieu, which might have formulated a
27 Sládek, To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda, op.cit., p. 23.
28 See P. Machonin., Strategie sociální transformace české společnosti, Brno: Doplněk, 1996, pp. 31-
43; P. Pithart and V. Klaus, ‘Rival Visions’, Journal of Democracy, 7 (1) January 1996, pp. 12-23; and
M. Potůček ‘Havel vs. Klaus: Public Policy in the Czech Republic’, Journal of Comparative Policy
Analysis and Practice, 1 (2), 1999, 163-96.14
more worked out and coherent ideal of democracy. SPR-RSČ ‘programmes’ are thus
typically short one-page lists of demands intended to highlight themes to voters, while
Sládek‘s own speeches and writing, which are the most extensive source for
understanding the party’s ideology, are often repetitive, rambling and loaded with
invective and hyperbole. Neither source engaged explicitly or coherently with
contemporary Czech debates about models of democracy. Secondly, the Republicans
were regarded by mainstream politicians and journalists and intellectuals as an
extremist pariah party and its views were not taken seriously and were therefore
largely ignored. Sládek, who bore a close physical resemblance to the British
comedian Rowan Atkinson, was thus widely dismissed by opponents as a disruptive
‘Mr Bean’ figure. Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, however, the Republicans’
discourses on democracy were confused because – unlike most Czech political parties
with the exception of the hardline Communists– they did not consider post-1989
Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic to be a democracy, but saw outward
pluralism simply as a facade for a new form of authoritarianism. The Republicans
thus rejected the idea that there was a meaningful democratic competition,
considering other parties mere vehicles for corrupt elites.
29 Sládek spoke of ‘pretend
new parties and … a fictitious political spectrum in Czechoslovakia. (...) Its goal is to
confuse voters in Czechoslovakia and create the impression that there is a multi-party
system in Czechoslovakia’
30 The Republicans’ pronouncements on democracy are
thus often simultaneously concerned with democratization – how to bring about
genuinely democratic system – and as well as what form such genuine democracy
might take.
29 Sládek, Jak to vidím já, op.cit., p.90.
30 Sládek ....tak to vidím já, op.cit., p. 71.15
The Republicans’ positions do nevertheless have an underlying coherence and logic,
which amount to an implicit strategy of transformation to an illiberal form of
democracy and market society.
31 The Republicans’ primary role, as they saw it, was
to ‘do battle with the current establishment’
32 to ‘intervene to save the nation from
destruction’
33 by bringing about genuine revolutionary regime change of the kind that
Civic Forum had pretended to carry out in November 1989. The Republicans saw
their party as a dynamic campaigning vehicle, whose main task was to mobilize
members and supporters through continuous demonstrations, public meetings and
rallies very much in the way that Havel’s Civic Forum had done during the Velvet in
November-December 1989.
The Republicans’ proposals for the type of democracy they would introduce in a
reformed political system offer somewhat sketchy and incoherent. Proposed
institutional reforms mentioned in Sládek’s writing include voters’ right of recall
legislators; proportional representation with no formal threshold; decentralization of
power to the level of the commune; the restoration of the four-fold provincial
structure of interwar Czechoslovakia; and a reduction of central government to a mere
seven ministries.
34 All were, however, claimed by the party to empower ordinary
people against corrupt professional politicians or enable popular control over elites.
Insofar as it is possible to identify any more general underlying model in Republican
pronouncements, it thus appears that the party saw democracy very largely as a simple
31 Machonin, Strategie sociální transformace, op.cit. pp. 31-43.
32 A. Kukelová, ‘K volbám’, Republika, no. 26, 26 June - 9 July 1992, p.3.
33 Sládek, To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda, op.cit., p. 4.
34 Sládek, ....tak to vidím já, op.cit., pp. 30, 65, 70 and To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda, op.cit, 43-48.16
mechanism for creating accountability between rulers and ruled, which could operate
to bring about the revolutionary displacement of discredited rulers. As Sládek put it
‘[i]n a functional democracy elections represent a mechanism not dissimilar to a
revolution’.
35 The role of parties was simply one of continual mobilization and
campaigning. In Sládek’s words ‘[f]or a political party the election campaign starts
the same day that the previous elections end. Otherwise it isn’t a political party, but a
group of layabouts (spolek lenochů).
36 However, other more contentious forms of
mobilization could also be justified. Sládek even went so far as to claim, on one
occasion that ‘[i]t would be easy and understandable and fully in accordance with the
Bill of Rights and Freedoms [in the Czech Constitution] to bring about the removal of
illegitimate authorities using any means, including violence’.
37
3. The Republicans and Czech democracy
The Czech Republic rapidly and successfully consolidated democracy after the
collapse of communism in November-December 1989 and, unlike Slovakia, suffered
few serious repercussions on its democratic development following the negotiated
break-up of the Czechoslovak federation at the end of 1992. However, the quality of
Czech democracy - and in particular the quality of elites-masses linkage - has been
persistently called into question. The broad Civic Forum (OF) movement which came
to power during the November-December 1989 ‘Velvet Revolution’ soon faced
criticism over the representativeness of its leadership structures and the real mandate
of its ex-dissident leaders. However, the Forum’s break-up in 1990-1 and rapid
35 Sládek, To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda, op.cit., 1995, p. 104.
36 Sládek, ....tak to vidím já, op.ci,, p. 236.
37 Sládek, To, co mám na mysli, je svoboda, op.cit., p. 72.17
replacement with conventionally organized parties, which then became dominant
actors in the political process, raised further questions. Although stable, formally
democratic in their internal organization and capable of articulating clear
programmatic positions to voters, Czech parties’ generally low memberships made
them closed organizations, vulnerable to the informal influence of vested interests.
Moreover, the rapid consolidation of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) which formed
from the right wing of Civic Forum in 1991 and the fragmented state of the Czech
centre-left enabled incumbent centre-right parties to politicize public administration
and turn a blind eye to corruption for much of the 1990s. While the emergence of the
Social Democrats (ČSSD) as the dominant party of the centre-left towards the end
decade brought more equal competition between left and right, it also led to a series of
close electoral contests, which failed to produce clear majority governments. The
resulting pragmatic co-operation between major parties of centre-left and centre-right
was then seen by critics as generating a collusive, clientelistic pattern of party politics,
which denied voter choice and further blocked citizen participation and civil society
development.
38
3.1 Positive effects on democracy?
How did the Czech Republicans fit into this pattern of democratic development? As
Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde suggest elsewhere in this volume, populists can, in
38 See A. Green and C. Leff Skalnik ‘The quality of democracy: Mass-elite linkages in the Czech
Republic’, Democratization. 4 (4), 1997, pp. 63-87; H. Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldová, R. Markowski and
G. Tóka, Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party Cooperation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; A. Roberts, ‘Demythologizing the Czech Opposition
Agreement’, Europe-Asia Studies, 55 (8), 2003, pp. 1273-1303; Hanley, The New Right in the New
Europe, op.cit.; M. A. Vachudova ‘Centre—Right Parties and Political Outcomes in East Central
Europe’, Party Politics, 14 (4), 2008, pp. 387-405; and J. Pehe, Demokracie bez demokratů: Úvahy o
společnosti a politice. Prague: Prostor, 2010.18
some circumstances, play the role of a democratic corrective by acting as a channel
for previously unexpressed interests and issues. This, however, presupposes either
that they have a degree of electoral support sufficient to make an effective claim on
power or, failing this, that they enjoy sufficient acceptance and co-operation from
established parties to enter the coalition-making game. The SPR-RSČ lacked both
significant electoral support and minimal levels of acceptance by other political
actors.
Although willing to share a television studio with SPR-RSČ representatives, from the
outset other parties (including the hard line Communists) treated the SPR-RSČ as an
extremist pariah party. All other parties considered the SPR-RSČ unacceptable as a
potential coalition partner at either national or local level and the Republicans, for
their part, seem to have had little interest in gaining office. However, although the
Republicans’ rhetorical suggestions of direct action and persistent racism, led some to
wonder whether there were grounds for banning the party as an anti-democratic
grouping,
39 there was little discussion about formalizing the effective cordon
sanitaire.
This reflected the fact that much debate about the Republicans – and extremist parties
more generally in the Czech Republic - was subsumed into the more politically salient
and controversial question of the status of the Communist Party. The main successor
to the former ruling party in the Czech lands, the Communist Party of Bohemia and
Moravia (KSČM), was an organizationally well entrenched and well supported
39 J. Fabrý, ‘Lze rozpustit republikány?’, Nová Přítomnost, 5/97, pp. 26-7. A 1991 law (amended in
2001) forbids the propagation of movements which ‘demonstrably tend towards the suppression of
human rights and freedoms or espouse ethnic, racial, religious or class hatred’. On the legal
background see ‘Zákaz propagace komunismu’, Revue Politika no. 2/2005. Online at
http://www.cdk.cz/rp/clanky/243/zakaz-propagace-komunismu/ (accessed 25 November 2010).19
organization,
40 but was regarded by mainstream parties as extreme and undemocratic
force, which posed a significant challenge for Czech democracy. In evidence, critics
highlighted KSČM’s anti-capitalist commitment a new type of socialist regime
distinct from capitalist democracy and its failure fully to repudiate Communist one
party-rule between 1948 and 1989. The legality of KSČM was subject to a series of
legal and political challenges by right-wing and liberal politicians during 1990s, while
no serious attempts were mounted against to ban the smaller and more ideologically
incohate SPR-RSČ.
41 However, despite such attempts the existence of lustration
legislation barring individual high-ranking former Communists from many forms of
public office,
42 in the political arena mainstream parties were content to maintain an
informal but openly stated cordon against the KSČM, which were ideologically so
distant from them as to be wholly unattractive as potential partner. The one exception
were the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD), who passed a formal congress resolution
in 1995 forbidding co-operation with the Communists of other ‘extremist parties’. The
resolution named a series ‘extremist parties’ alongside the KSČM, including the SPR-
RSČ. However, characteristically for such debates the Republicans‘ inclusion served
principally to blur the contentious issue of co-operation with the KSČM, which
sharply divided the ČSSD.
43
40Between 1990 and 1998 KSČM’s electoral support ranged from 10 to 14 per cent. In 1998 its
membership was an estimated 120,000. SPR-RSČ membership records were chaotic and its claimed
membership of 50, 000 clearly inflated. A realistic estimate based on candidates fielded in the 1994
local elections would suggest a membership of perhaps 5000 – 10,000.
41 ‘Zákaz propagace komunismu’, op.cit.
42 See K. Williams, ‘Lustration as the Securitization of Democracy in Czechoslovakia and the Czech
Republic’, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 19 (4), 2003, 1-24. Lustration bans
did not extend to elected office.
43 L. Kopeček, ‘Czech Social Democracy and its “cohabitation” with the Communist Party: The story
of a neglected affair’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 41 (3), 2008, pp. 317-38. Social
Democrats interpreted the resolution as barring national co-operation with the Communists.20
The cordon sanitaire around the SPR-RSČ – and the party’s own lack of interest in
programmatic issues or gaining office through the coalition-making politics– meant
that it had no policy influence or indirect leverage on other parties. Even the
Republicans’ existence as a parliamentary pariah party had limited relevance: until
1996 liberal and centre-right governments enjoyed clear parliamentary majorities in
the Czech lands. Only with the inconclusive parliamentary elections of 1996 did the
parliamentary presence of the Republicans (and the Communists) as an
uncoalitionable party have an influence on political outcomes, contributing to an
agreement for the formation of a minority centre-right government negotiated with the
Social Democrats. However, the continuation of this pattern of deadlock in several
subsequent elections following the political demise of the Republicans in 1998
suggests that the SPR-RSČ was one among many contributing factors.
Nor, viewed from the perspective of political mobilization, can it be argued, that the
Republicans helped facilitate cross-class politics: politics in the Czech Republic in the
early 1990s as in other post-communist Central and Eastern Europe was not based on
rigid historically based class blocs, that a populist movement might bridge –
communist societies lacked a conventional class structure; the concept of class was
discredited and overshadow by the focus on democratization and social
transformation; and the post-1989 social structure was in flux, resulting in a transition
politics that was already highly dynamic and ‘cross-class’. Nor arguably did the
Republicans helped expand the political realm as in post-communist transition politics
most, if not all, aspects of economy, state and society were already politicized and
subject to political debate and political decision-making about how they should be
transformed into autonomous, non-political systems.21
The Republican phenomenon did give voice to topics and groups that did not find a
voice in the mainstream post-transition discourse of elites associated with Civic
Forum: radical anti-communism, anti-German nationalism and anti-Roma racism (the
‘Gypsy problem’).They also politically mobilized and politically engaged a certain
segment of Czech society – young, poorly educated, predominantly male – which
might otherwise have been politically disengaged. In a more underlying sense, the
party’s nationalism, authoritarianism and commitment to economic statism and a
large communist-era welfare state also provided a means for many of voters to
express their support for the values and policies of outgoing communist regime, while
in their own minds radically disavowing it. To some extent, especially in 1990-1, the
Republicans could also be credited with introducing – or, at least, alerting the Czech
public of – that democratic politics entailed conflict and competition, not (just)
consensus.
Many of the statements in the preceding paragraph must, however, be markedly
qualified. The SPR-RSČ was, in many cases, far from the only outsider vehicle for
expressing such public sentiments ‘silent majority’ issues that elites did not wish to
acknowledge. Radical anti-communist views emerged into the public arena very
quickly through more establishment-oriented groupings such as the Confederation of
Political Prisoners (KPV), Club of Committed Independents (KAN) and, most
notably, in the splits in Civic Forum itself, which propelled Václav Klaus to the
chairmanship of the Forum in October 1990 and led to the foundation of the centre-
right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) the following year. With the waning of ODS
anti-communism, always more rhetorical than real, new parties such as the
Democratic Union (DEU) and Right Bloc (PB) parties –founded respectively in 1994
and 1996 - offered additional vehicles for right-wing radical anti-communism devoid22
of the SPR-RSČ’s racism and etatistic economic remedies. Anti-German nationalism
very similar in tone and focus to that of the Republicans was strongly expressed by
the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The only ‘silent majority’
issue that SPR-RSČ was unique in voicing was that the ‘Gypsy Problem’: a belief that
Roma were an undeserving, criminal minority generating a range social problems
against whom punitive and repressive policies should be targeted – a sentiment
prevalent across large parts of Czech society.
44 However, the Republicans’ obvious
extremism and lack intellectual and programmatic sophistication made it a highly
ineffective champion of such issues. The SPR-RSČ’s culture of extremism and
paranoia, which served to mobilize members, also cut the party off from broader
Czech society, making it, in the words of former leading Republicans, a
‘microcosm’
45 and ‘a sect, which abhorred everything and everyone around it’.
46 The
net impact of its activities was to arguably produce a closing of ranks among other
parties and confirm the taboo status of its illiberal nationalist and racist views.
3.2 Negative effects?
The negative effects of the SPR-RSČ on Czech democracy are somewhat easier to
enumerate, although here too the Republicans’ relatively weakness and isolation limited
their scope and it would almost certainly be an exaggeration to speak of them as ever being
in any sense a threat to Czech democracy or democratization. The Republican vision was
certainly one which overwhelmingly stressed popular sovereignty and devoid of any liberal
concern for check and balances, minority rights or the rule of law. However, the party’s
44 See R. Fawn ‘Czech Attitudes Towards Roma: “Expecting More of Havel’s Country”’, Europe-Asia
Studies, 53 (8), 2001, 1193-1219.
45 An anonymous former leading Republican cited in ‘Sládkovo krédo: Věrnost, blbost a pracovitost’,
Lidové noviny, 18 June 1998.
46 Petr Vrzáň, a former Republican parliamentary deputy quoted in Tácha, ‘Živili jsme Sládka’, op.cit.23
lack of power and influence left it in no position to circumvent such rights in practice.
Indeed, as various court cases involving the party and its leaders show, legal provisions
protecting the rights of others were often enforced against them. The Republicans’
moralistic and radical discourse demonizing and abusing political opponents and rejecting
the legitimacy of the political system did little to foster a culture of dialogue or consensus in
Czech public life. However, as suggested above, the Republicans did arguably help cement
a form of establishment consensus among mainstream parties to affirm liberal norms
regarding the (non-)ethnic character of the Czech state and the civic character of Czech
nationalism and national identity. Liberal understandings of Czech nationalism were,
however, sufficiently strong and embedded
47 that it is unlikely that the Republican
challenge, even if it had been less self-defeatingly crude and extreme, would have opened
up political space for conservative ethno-nationalist themes. Overall, the role played by the
SPR-RSČ broadly conforms to the expectations of Rovira Kaltwasser and Mudde that weak
populist forces in an unconsolidated, new democracy will play the role more of corrective
than threat to democracy. However, the SPR-RSČ’s political isolation and lack of political
and intellectual credibility left it poorly equipped to make any meaningful critique of the
socio-economic exclusion, alienation and disempowerment of some groups in post-
communist Czech society or the corruption that increasingly marred post-communist
transformation.
48
3.3 The Republicans’ outsider populism: Causes and context
47 For an in-depth discussion comparing Czech and Polish nationalism and their relationship with
liberalism see S. Auer, Liberal Nationalism in Central Europe. London and New York.
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
48 See Q. Reed ‘Political Corruption, Privatisation and Control in the Czech Republic: A Case Study of
Problems in Multiple Transition’, Unpublished DPhil thesis, Oriel College, Oxford, 1996.24
The case of the SPR-RSČ is broadly in step with the hypotheses advanced in the
introduction of this volume about wider contexts , which determine the impact of
populism on democracy, although it also raises some questions: the Republicans’
nationalist, anti-communist and welfarist ideology led the party to radical positions
rejecting the legitimacy of Czech democracy and advocating the possible use of
violence which – although never acted upon and containing strong elements of
hyperbole and farce – were potentially threatening to democracy had the party won
greater mass support. Such discourses were clearly more exclusionary rather than
inclusionary centring particularly on the Roma minority. This fits the expectation that
in a country with low levels of socio-economic inequality, such as the Czech
Republic,
49 populists will tend to adopt discourses of (usually ethnic exclusion).
However, it should be noted that, apart from the Roma minority (estimated at up to 5
per cent of the population) the Czech Republic also had low socio-cultural diversity
and was (and is) ethnically homogeneous. In line with arguments advanced in the
introduction to the volume, that the generally high levels of legitimacy enjoyed by the
political establishment of ex-dissidents and technocrats swept to power by the
November 1989 Velvet Revolution and elected in a landslide victory in free elections
in 1990 may explain the Republicans’ limited electoral and political impact. The
Republican case also confirms the suggested association of party system
fragmentation and populist success: the rise of the SPR-RSČ in 1991-2 coincided with
a period of flux in Czech party politics following the disintegration of Civic Forum
and its containment and subsequent demise with the consolidation of the party system
49 Levels of income inequality in the Czech Republic in the 1990s were among the lowest in Central
and Eastern Europe. See T. I. Garner ‘and K. Terrell ‘A Gini decomposition analysis of inequality in
the Czech Republic and Slovakia during the transition’, Economics of Transition, 6 (1), 1998, 23-46.25
in mid-late 1990s. It should be noted, however, that openness’ of Czech party-
electoral politics may also have been a braking factor on the SPR-RSČ as - although
it established a hegemonic position on the extreme right – it faced a range of other
parties and groups articulating an anti-establishment and/or anti-communist message.
4. Legacies of the SPR-RSČ
The SPR-RSČ has left few strong discernable legacies in Czech politics. Despite a
brief personal comeback in local politics in 2003-4 during which he became mayor of
a small borough on the outskirts of Brno, Miroslav Sládek appears to be a marginal,
semi-retired figure,
50 now widely derided even on the Czech radical right for his
political failures.
51 Most other leading members of the SPR-RSČ of the 1990s seem
to have left politics, although former rank-and-file Republicans have reportedly been
active at grassroots level in a variety of parties and movements, the most notable
being the former editor of Republika, Andrea Cerqueirová, who is now a prominent
campaigning journalist writing on lesbian and feminist issues. Some younger activists
in the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (RMS) have, however, remained active on the
Czech far-right: Tomáš Vandas the former RMS secretary was the leader of the
Workers Party (DS) which he formed in 2003; currently the most well supported
radical right organization in the Czech Republic. However, the DS seemed largely to
have moved away Sládek’s recipe of a ‘Republicanism’ (republikánstí) blending
radical right and populist appeals in favour of a more overtly neo-fascist style,
50 I. Svobodová, ‘Sládek: Politiku jsem ještě nevzdal’. Mladá fronta Dnes, 19 March 2006. Online
edition. Available http://zpravy.idnes.cz/domaci.asp?r=domaci&c=A060319_081941_domaci_jan
(accessed 23 November 2010).
51 For example, right-wing Czech blogger D-Fens commented that ‘…for a short time the party
functioned more or less normally, but then its chairman [Sládek] started to go a bit loopy [začal
magořit] and in 1996-8 the only people hanging on were those on good terms with the chairman or who
didn’t oppose him..’. ‘Republikán(ka) Andrea’, dated 8 March 2007. Online. Available at
http://www.dfens-cz.com/view.php?cisloclanku=2007030803 (accessed 1 July 2010).26
stressing street and sub-cultural politics, rather than election campaigning reaching
out to a mass of discontented voters. The Workers’ Party’s aggressive protests in
areas with high concentrations of Roma and paramilitary style parades, which have
gained it considerable publicity, appear closer to the strategy of Hungary’s Jobbik
than the Republican model of the 1990s developed by Sládek.
52 Indeed, in 2010 the
radicalism of the Workers Party led to its formal banning for unconstitutional anti-
democratic extremism in February 2010, a fate the Republicans easily escaped.
The Republicans also appear to have left little real ideological legacy. Shortly after
the political collapse of the Republicans in 1998-1999, the mainstream, the centre-
right Civic Democratic Party (ODS) of Václav Klaus start to explore anti-German
nationalism – albeit in different and usually more measured terms than the SPR-RSČ
– as part of a realignment towards ‘national interests’ and a more explicit defence of
Czech statehood against the supposed encroachment of Germany and the EU.
However, although the demise of the SPR-RSČ arguably diminished the taboo status
of overtly expressed Czech nationalism, closer examination of the Civic Democrats’
trajectory reveals that its ‘nationalist turn’ owed more to internal development and
debates, than any external influences.
53 Indeed, even the few fringe elements linked to
ODS which have sought to develop a embrace more ethnically-based conservative-
nationalist form of right-wing politics , such as the Young Right group, have drawn
on foreign models or the historical ‘integral nationalist’ National Democratic tradition
of the interwar period, rather than the legacy of Sládek and his party.
54
52 The Workers’ Party (DS) has a limited electoral base: it polled 1.07 per cent in the 2009 European
elections and, under a slightly different label, won 1.14 per cent in the 2010 parliamentary elections.
53 Despite an initially outwardly Thatcherite, neo-liberal ideology, ODS discourse always contained
many classical Czech nationalist tropes See Hanley, The New Right in the New Europe, op.cit. 180-5/
54 See S. Hanley, ‘Klaus thinktank warns of Islamicisation’. Blog posting dated 21 August 2007.
Online. Available27
Similarly, no party, with the exception of the far-right groups discussed above, has
ever taken up the Republicans’ harsh approach to the Roma minority, although Czech
public opinion continues to be largely hostile to Roma
55 and some local politicians
from mainstream parties running for the Czech Senate or in municipal elections have
campaigned against Roma in thinly disguised form, often winning landslide victories.
Some politicians from the Public Affairs (VV) party, which unexpectedly entered the
Czech parliament in May 2010 after an unexpected meteoric rise, have similarly
advocated tough measures against anti-social behaviour in housing estates where large
numbers of Roma live, even going so far as to advocate the use of citizen patrols.
However, no such tendencies are detectable within the position of VV as a whole,
whose highly successful political strategy combined anti-establishment populist
rhetoric denouncing established parties as corrupt ‘political dinosaurs’ with calls for
market-oriented reforms and greater use of direct democracy.
56
Perhaps the closest equivalent to Sládek’s Republicanism found in contemporary
Czech politics can be detected in the left-wing eurosceptic Sovereignty bloc, led by
former newsreader and former independent MEP Jana Bobošíková. Although it
rhetoric is not anti-communist, Bobošíková‘s party - an amalgamation of
independents‘ grouping and fringe parties, which was formed in 2009- has an
economically interventionist, nationalist and euroseptic programme framed in populist
terms as a critique of an indolent and corrupt elite with surprising echoes of Sládek
http://drseansdiary.blogspot.com/2007/07/klaus-thinktank-newsletter-warns-of.html (accessed 1
December 2010).
55 ‘Poll shows poor relations between public and Roma’, Czech Daily Monitor, 13 May 2010, p.1.
56 ‘Veci veřejné politický program’. Online. Available http://www.veciverejne.cz/politicky-
program.html (accessed 5 May 2010).28
and the SPR-RSČ of 1990s.
57 Like the SPR-RSČ, Sovereignty is also heavily
dependent on high profile, charismatic leader, although Bobošíková projects an image
combining professionalism, toughness and feminity very different from theat of
Sládek .
58 However, once again no direct linkages with the old SPR-RSČ are
traceable, suggesting, at most, that the same structural conditions that helped shap the
Republicans may have endured and influenced the development of other populist
parties.
5. Conclusions
The SPR-RSČ was a radical right populist outsider, whose populism was strongly
shaped by the transitional context of early democratization in which it emerged. Key
to the party’s populism was a blurred distinction between a socially unifying, politics
of revolutionary regime change and conventional democratic competition between
parties. The Republican’ populist discourse and understandings of democracy were
thus strongly shaped by a radical anti-communist view of transition from communism
in 1989 as incomplete, unjust and manipulated. The impacts of the party on Czech
democracy are broadly those anticipated of a non-incumbent outsider populist party in
the introduction to this volume. However, such impacts – both positive and negative -
were limited by the party’s relatively low electoral base, short life span; isolation from
the liberal-democratic mainstream of Czech party political and political discourse; and
57 See Bobošíková‘s speech launching her party’s election programme on 3 May 2010 in which she
denounced the EU for ‘…pseudo-humanist and so-called politically correct waffle about human rights
and minorities…’. ‘Volby 2010 - naděje pro Českou republiku, projev lídra Suverenity Jany
Bobošíkové na programové konferenci’. Online. Available
http://www.suverenita.cz/aktuality/_zobraz=volby-2010---nadeje-pro-ceskou-republiku,-projev-lidra-
suverenity-jany-bobosikove-na-programove-konferenci (accessed 15 November 2010).
58 The party, whose full name is Sovereignty – the Jana Bobošíková Bloc., polled 4.26 per cent in the
2009 European elections and 3.67 per cent in the Czech 2010 parliamentary elections.29
inability to formulate a more programmatically coherent and intellectually
sophisticated radical right populist discourse.
As Vladimíra Dvořáková has suggested,
59 the Republicans are therefore perhaps best
understood as a product, albeit it an unusual product, of a broader Czech anti-political
tradition with cultural and political roots in 19
th century, which views professionalized
political elites and state institutions as inherently inauthentic and corrupt, and instead
stresses the need for a ‘moral politics’ backed and brought about by citizen
mobilization and self-organization.
60 Such anti-political traditions can be seen as
shaping the political outlooks of numerous other actors in post-1989 Czech politics
including: President Václav Havel and other ex-dissident politicians; the many local
independents’ groupings still active in Czech electoral politics; the civic protest
movements such the ‘Thank You, Time to Go’ initiative that erupted in November
1999 to protest against established parties’ perceived clientelism;
61 as well as newer,
anti-establishment parties such as Public Affairs.
59 V. Dvořáková.’The Politics of anti-politics? The Radical Right in the Czech Republic: Past and
Present in L.B. Sørensen and L. Eliason (eds.), Fascism, Liberalism and Social Democracy in Central
Europe, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, pp. 166-79.
60 For a succinct discussion see Belohradský’s essay ‘O politice politické a antipolitické’. V.
Belohradský, Kapitalismus a občanské ctnosti, Prague: Československý spisovatel, 1992, pp. 31-4.
61 V. Dvořáková, ‘Civil Society in the Czech Republic: '”Impulse 99”' and “Thank You, Time
To Go” in P. Kopecký and C. Mudde (eds.) Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in
Post-Communist Europe. London: Routledge, 2003, pp. 134-56.30
Tables
Table 1: Electoral support for SPR-RSČ in the Czech Republic in elections to the
Czechoslovak Federal Assembly 1990-2*
Chamber of the People (lower house)
Year Number of votes Percentage Deputies (of 99 from Czech
Republic)**
1990 67 781 0.94 0
1992 420 848 6.48 8
Chamber of Nations (upper house)
Year Number of votes Percentage Deputies (of 75 from Czech
Republic)
1990 72 155 1.00 0
1992 413 459 6.37 6
* Representation in the Czechoslovak Federal Assembly was based upon separate
polls in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In total (with the inclusion of deputies from
Slovakia) 150 deputies sat in each Chamber.
** 101 deputies were elected to the Chamber of the People for the Czech Republic in
1990. This was reduced to 99 in 1992.
Source: Czech Electoral Commission website www.volby.cz
Table 2: Electoral support for SPR-RSČ and successor organizations in elections to
the Czech parliament 1990-2010*
Year Number of votes Percentage Deputies (of 200)
1990 72 048 1.00 0
1992 387 026 5.98 14
1996 485 072 8.01 18
1998 232 965 3.90 0
2002** 46 325 0.97 0
2006 Not contested Not contested -
2010*** 1 193 0.03 0
Source: Czech Electoral Commission website www.volby.cz
*Elections in 1990 and 1992 were for Czech National Council, subsequent elections
to Chamber of Deputies
** Miroslav Sládek Republicans (RMS)
*** Re-founded SPR-RSČ. Electoral lists in 3 of 14 districts.